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Abstract: 
This paper studies the determinants of sovereign bond yields in nine emerging Asian countries over the 
period 1994-2012. In the long-run, we first reveal that sovereign bond yields weakly and negatively 
depends on the changes in public debt. This result is not consistent with the theoretical hypothesis that 
rising government debt may foster sovereign bond yields through the default risk. Second, we fail to find 
out a long-run relationship between potential economic growth and sovereign borrowing costs in 
emerging Asia. Lastly, this paper evidences the preliminary interventions of emerging Asian authorities in 
separating government debt management from monetary management.  
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1. Introduction 
After the 1997 Asian crisis, due to multiple bank failures and the vulnerability of a heavy 
reliance on foreign currency borrowing, emerging Asia has needed other alternatives to bank 
credit and foreign currency debt as sources of funding. Moreover, calling for other capital 
sources could allow emerging Asia to finance its accelerating growth and to avoid currency 
mismatches. In this circumstance, the choice of emerging Asia has been to develop a well-
functioning local currency bond market, including government bonds, corporate bonds and 
mortgage bonds. A well-functioning local bond market, which is considered as an alternative 
to the banking sector brings a number of benefits to emerging Asia. First, the development of 
bond markets not only increases the supply of available financial assets, but also fosters a 
rise in competition on the financing market and contributes to lower borrowing and 
intermediation costs for households and companies. Second, the deepening of local bond 
market also results in the design of more sophisticated financial products (derivatives, 
securitization…) and the risk diversification. In particular, government bonds provide a 
benchmark yield curve for the issue of private sector bonds and thus facilitate the pricing. 
Third, in a strengthened local bond markets, the central banks dispose of more sophisticated 
instruments for their monetary policy and can apply interest rate policies instead of direct 
credit control policies. Lastly, a well-functioning yield curve provides efficient information 
about market expectations and allows central banks to use market-oriented instruments, 
notably interest rates, to manage their monetary policies instead of manipulating private 
credit or bank reserve requirements.  
To foster the development of local bond markets, Asian authorities have had to face to a 
number of challenges. One of the key challenges is to shed light on determinants of bond 
yields. Resolving this issue also allows explaining a tremendous variation in the interest 
rates across countries and over time, which governments or companies pay on their external 
debt. In the literature, borrowing costs depend on the fundamental conditions in the 
economy, and especially the fiscal accounts. However, we should distinguish between long-
run and short-run determinants of bond yields. The main reason is that the long-run linkage 
between borrowing costs and macroeconomic fundamentals can break down in the short-
run, in particular during the periods of financial turmoil. In light of this meaning, the present 
paper tends to examine the long-run and short-run determinants of bond yields for a sample 
of emerging Asian countries - one of the most dynamic emerging financial markets. On the 
other hand, this paper only focuses on determinants of sovereign bond yields due to the fact 
that information on local currency bonds in emerging countries is lacking. We first employ 
4 
 
the General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
for a dynamic heterogeneous panel will be used to assess explicitly the transmission 
channels through which the macroeconomic fundamentals can affect sovereign bond yields. 
We also use the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator that allows controlling for simultaneity 
bias and reverse causality running from explicative variables to sovereign bond yields. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. 
Section 3 documents recent trends in local bond yields in emerging Asia. Section 4 describes 
the data and details the chosen empirical method. Section 5 presents and discusses the 
empirical findings. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.   
 
2. Literature review 
As mentioned in the introductory section, the existing literature distinguishes between the 
long-run and short-run determinants of sovereign bond yields. In the long term, the first 
determinant of sovereign bond yields is potential output growth. According to Laubach 
(2009), a useful benchmark model, which explains this relationship, is the Ramsey model of 
optimal growth. Combined with a representative household with CES utility, the Ramsey 
model implies that the deterministic steady state of the real rate of return on capital is 
determined by: 
 =  +   (1) 
where r is the rate of return, g denotes the net growth rate of per capita consumption, σ is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, and θ is the household's rate of time preference. The rate 
of return positively depends on all three of these parameters.  
The second long-run macroeconomic determinant of sovereign bond yields is the 
government debt. The link between the government debt and real bond yields can be 
illustrated by the fact that fiscal expansion may reduce private investment. Engen and 
Hubbard (2004) suggest that a decline in private investment leads to a lower steady-state 
capital stock, which in turn stimulates marginal product of capital and consequently 
increases real interest rate. Additionally, by developing an early-warning model of sovereign 
debt crises, Manasse et al. (2003) imply that rising government debt may foster sovereign 
bond yields through the default risk premium.  
In addition to the long-run determinants, in the short-run, government bond yields may be 
also affected by a number of macroeconomic variables. First of all, monetary policy rate can 
affect nominal interest rates through its impact on inflation expectations. As shown in 
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neoclassical models with nominal rigidities (Woodford, 2003), the monetary authority has to 
control short-term real interest rates and reinforce the role of stabilization policy in order to 
affect real activity. The government control over short-term real interest rates can be written 
by the following equation (Laubach, 2009):  
 = 	
 + 
∗ +  + 
∗  (2) 
Where  is expected inflation in the period (t+1), and the natural rate 
∗ is a function of 
the factors shown in Equation 1 and presents the value of the real interest rate with the 
presence of nominal rigidities. From Equation 2, the real interest rate between two periods t 
and t+1 is defined as  =  − .  
Together with monetary policy, financial openness has been considered as a short-run 
determinant of sovereign bond yields, especially in the case of emerging economies which 
have experienced comparatively large capital inflows over recent years. For instance, foreign 
investors can be an important source of demand for local debt securities and thus help lower 
bond yields (IMF, 2005). Foreign participation can also help increase the liquidity of 
government bond markets. However, foreign participation could lead to greater rate 
volatility. Differing from this meaning, Prasad and Rajan (2008) find that foreign 
participation, supported by the necessary institutional and regulatory framework, may 
minimize volatility. Lastly, temporary changes in fiscal position and variations of output gap 
are also considered as the key factors that lead to temporary changes in sovereign bond 
yields.  
To shed light on the theoretical hypotheses, a large number of recent empirical works have 
been developed. Most of empirical studies have focused on the case of the U.S. and the key 
role of fiscal imbalance on determining sovereign bond yields. Using a sample of US states , 
Bayoumi et al. (1995) find that sovereign debt levels affect state spreads versus New Jersey 
(the benchmark) in a non-linear way. At the mean level of debt, an increase of one 
percentage point in the ratio of debt to state product can raise 23 basis points in interest rate. 
The non-linear relationship between fiscal imbalance and bond yields is also found in 
Conway and Orr (2002) for the major OECD countries, in which the impacts of fiscal factors 
on interest rate are non-linear and tend to be greater at higher levels of indebtedness. By 
contrast, employing a VAR approach, Plosser (1987) and Evans (1987) do not support the 
impact of unexpected changes in fiscal variables on government bond yields.2 On the other 
hand, several recent studies tend to show that sovereign borrowing costs could depend on 
                                                          
2 See further Haugh et al., 2009 for a review of empirical literature.   
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expected rather than current fiscal variables. Using predicted values of U.S. fiscal variables as 
determinants of sovereign bond yields, Laubach (2009) finds that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the expected government debt-to-GDP ratio raises real long-term government 
bond yield by about 2-5 basis points. Instead of the case study of the U.S., Chinn and Frankel 
(2005) use time series data for the 1988-2004 period to study separately the cases of five 
European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K.) and compare with the U.S. 
The author argues that the impact of a 1 percentage point increase in the government debt-
to-GDP ratio on real long-term government bond yields varies slightly across countries. The 
impact is stronger in European countries, ranging from 5-8 basis points (Germany) to 10-16 
basis points (France, Italy, the U.K., and Spain), compared to the U.S., where the impact is 5 
basis points.  
While the single-country studies mostly explore a static specification or the dynamic impacts 
of fiscal variables on government borrowing costs, the panel data studies typically employ 
the Fixed – effects (FE) estimation to resolve the question of interest. Together with fiscal 
variables measured by the debt-to-GDP ratio, another potential long-run determinants of 
sovereign bond yields, notably GDP growth, is also introduced in the cross-country studies.  
Kinoshita (2006) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model linking government bond 
yields to government debt. The author also provides numerical simulations by using a panel 
of 19 industrial economies. Kinoshita finds that the simulated and estimated interest rate 
effects of government debt tend to be small, while an increase in government consumption 
and debt leads to a considerably larger effect. Precisely, a 1 percentage point increase in the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio raises the real long-term government bond yield by about 2-5 
basis points.  
Similarly, basing on a panel of 16 OECD countries over 1960-2002, Ardagna et al. (2007) 
examines the impact of fiscal deficit and debt on long-term government bond yields through 
two different econometric approaches. In a simple static specification, they find that a one 
percentage point increase in the primary deficit relative to GDP increases contemporaneous 
long-term interest rates by about 10 basis points. On the other hand, in a VAR approach, the 
same shock leads to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis points after 10 years. The 
authors also confirm nonlinearities in the impact of government debt: debt affects the interest 
rate only in the case of countries with above-average levels of debt. In another study basing 
on a sample of ten euro area countries over 1979-2002, Faini (2006) finds no significant 
impact of government debt on long-term government bond yields in individual country 
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regressions while the positive impact of public debt becomes significant for the 10 euro area 
countries as a whole. Similarly to Ardagna et al. (2007), Faini (2006) also concludes a non-
linear relationship between sovereign debt and sovereign borrowing costs.  
Recently, Poghosyan (2012) analyzes determinants of sovereign bond yields in 22 advanced 
economies over the 1980-2010 period by employing the panel cointegration techniques, 
which allows the author to distinguish between long-run (debt-to-GDP ratio, potential 
growth) and short-run (inflation, short-term interest rates, etc.) determinants. The main 
finding is that in the long-run, government bond yields increase by about 2 basis points due 
to a 1 percentage point increase in government debt-to-GDP ratio and by about 45 basis 
points due to a 1 percentage point increase in potential growth rate. In the short-run, 
sovereign bond yields deviate from the level determined by the long-run fundamentals, but 
about half of the deviation adjusts in one year.  
Overall, the existing recent empirical literature on determinants of sovereign bond yields can 
be subdivided into two strands: single-country studies and panel data studies. On the other 
hand, to the best of our knowledge, the existing empirical studies seem to only focus on the 
case of advanced countries, except the contribution of Baldacci and Kumar (2010) using a 
sample of 31 advanced and emerging economies during the pre-crisis period 1980-2008. 
According to Baldacci and Kumar, higher deficits and public debt result in a significant 
increase in long-term interest rates. Moreover, the magnitude of this impact strongly 
dependents on initial fiscal, institutional and other structural conditions, as well as spillovers 
from global financial markets. However, the findings of this paper should be taken with 
caution given the very heterogeneous levels of economic development between advanced 
economies and emerging economies. The aim of our paper is, therefore, to provide a 
complementary contribution to the literature as asking for the question “What factors affect 
the sovereign bond yields in emerging Asia?”, which has not yet deal with in earlier studies.  
 
3. Recent trends in emerging Asia’s sovereign bond yields 
As shown in Figure 1, sovereign bond yields in emerging Asia vary across countries and 
over the time. Since 1994, a downward trend in government bond yields has been observed 
in emerging Asia. In the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, the decline has been 
particularly significant, due to their structurally higher interest rates level. The main reason 
explaining this trend is the inflation decline and the improvement of economic fundamentals 
in emerging Asia. Besides, before the subprime crisis period, lower public debt in emerging 
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Asia and abundant global capital source lead to a sharp declining in sovereign bonds’ 
issuance. This favorable macroeconomic circumstance encouraged both foreign and domestic 
investors to buy local bonds and then push sovereign bond yields lower.  
<Insert Figure 1> 
In 2008, following the beginning of global economic recession, Asian sovereign bond yields 
went through two different phases. First, Asian yields surged in early 2008 due to an 
important increase in commodity prices, which in turn led to the back of inflationary 
concerns. Another main factor behind this figure is an important increase in central bank rate 
hikes as shown in Figure 2 (for example, 219bp in Indonesia, 42bp in India). The second 
phase began in the last half of 2009 when sovereign bond yields started to decline. This 
downturn could be explained by the global credit crisis (notably with the Lehman Brothers 
failure) and the subsequent lower growth and inflation expectations. A remarkable downfall 
is observed from the last quarter of 2009, when Asian central banks started a cycle of 
monetary easing and aggressively cutting rates.  
<Insert Figure 2> 
Despite local and global concerns, sovereign bond markets in Asia staged a recovery in the 
last quarter of 2011, with most yield curves flattening. So that, emerging Asian bond markets 
have been largely viewed as a safe haven for domestic and foreign investors for two 
following reasons. First, the low debt positions of most emerging East Asian economies make 
them attractive to investors compared with debt-laden Europe. On one hand, the balance 
sheets of most Asian economies remain strong. On the other hand, the external debt-to-GDP 
ratios have either declined significantly since 2009, or have stayed at manageable levels. 
Second, domestic factors in emerging Asia, including healthy banking systems, are also 
strengthening the bond markets in general and the sovereign bond markets in particular. 
 
4. Data and empirical methodology 
As mentioned above, basing on a sample of 9 emerging Asian countries: China, Hong Kong – 
China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, this 
empirical study aims to investigate the long-run and short-run determinants of sovereign 
bond yields. Given this aim, our empirical strategy endeavors to make maximum use of both 
the time and cross-country dimensions of available data sets, which dictates using data at a 
quarterly frequency in the estimation. Our empirical specification partially adopted from 
Pogoshyan (2012) takes the following form:  
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where i and t indices denote country and time, and the dependent variable is real sovereign 
bond yields ( . Equation 3 includes two long-run determinants (LRit-1): the potential growth 
rate and the debt-to-GDP ratio. In light of the existing literature, we also introduce in the 
empirical model five short-run determinants	*+(: real money market rate (monetary 
policy effect), changes in inflation (nominal shocks), fiscal balance ratio (short-term fiscal 
policy), economic growth rate (cyclical fluctuations), and foreign participation in the local 
bond markets (captured by the stock of foreign holdings of local currency bonds). We also 
include lagged dependent variable in the right hand side of Equation 3. ,( is a disturbance 
term assumed to satisfy the Gauss–Markov conditions. A trend term - has been introduced 
to allow for a shift of the intercept over time.  
Differing from Pogoshyan (2012), we also tend to analyze the impacts of global factors on 
sovereign bond yields by introducing in the empirical model two indicators	./(. First, the 
U.S. Federal funds rate is used a proxy for global liquidity conditions. According to Csonto 
and Ivaschenko (2013), as lower Fed funds rate is assumed to be associated with higher 
liquidity, it is expected to have a positive relationship the variations of sovereign bond 
yields. Second, a dummy variable takes the value of 1 during the crisis period and of 0 in 
other cases. This dummy allows us to resolve the conundrum of government bond yields’ 
volatility and high fiscal imbalances observed in the aftermath of the crisis. 
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the magnitude of fiscal factors’ impact on sovereign 
bond yields varies across countries. Baldacci and Kumar (2010) argue that the overall impact 
of higher deficits on interest rates could be greater in countries with the following 
characteristics: weak initial fiscal conditions, weak or inadequate institutions, weak 
structural factors (such as low domestic savings), and limited access to global capital. For this 
reason, our empirical model also allows for an additional interactive term between the fiscal 
balance /0(	and a dummy variable 1(reflecting countries’ characteristics listed above.  
However, several econometric problems may arise from Equation 3:  
i) The independent variables are assumed to be endogenous. Because causality may 
run in both directions – from independent variables to dependent variable and 
also these regressors may be correlated with the error term.  
ii) Time-invariant individual characteristics (fixed effects) can be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. 
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iii) Introducing lagged dependent variable gives rise to the correlation between the 
regressors and the error term. Because of this correlation, dynamic panel data 
estimation of Equation 3 suffers from the Nickell (1981) bias, which disappears 
only if T tends to infinity. 
In addition, heteroscedasticity is expected to be present because, in the panel data, 
heterogeneous errors might exist with different panel members. To resolve these problems, 
the GMM method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) seems to produce more efficient 
and consistent estimators compared with other procedures. This method also eliminates any 
endogeneity that may be due to the correlation of these country specific effects and the right 
hand side regressors. If we first difference Equation 3, we get: 
 
∆ = ∆ +∆ + ∆ + ∆ ! + "∆!# × % + & + ∆'   (4) 
 
In equation 4, we have removed group effects and time trend. We now turn to the two key 
tests of the GMM estimator. The first one is the serial correlation test derived by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), in which the null hypothesis assumes no serial correlation in error term. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) introduce the tests for serial correlation, often labelled “m1” for 
first-order and “m2” for second-order serial correlation. We expect to find the first-order 
serial correlation in the first differenced residuals. The key problem arises if there is the 
second or a higher order serial correlation, suggesting that some of the moment conditions 
are invalid. The second one is the Sargan test to assess the model specification and over-
identifying restrictions, whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. This test is 
also known in the GMM context as the Hansen’s J test.  
Data setting 
Our empirical analysis uses the sample consists of quarterly data on real sovereign bond 
yields and their fundamental determinants for the period 1994-2012 for nine emerging Asian 
countries.  10-year benchmark government bond yields available in Datastream will be used 
as a measure of sovereign borrowing costs Data on fundamental macroeconomic variables 
was obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and other international and 
national sources (see Appendix 1). Exceptionally, the data on potential economic growth rate 
is not available for the case of emerging and developing countries. We therefore use the 
average value of growth rates during ten previous periods as a potential growth rate. 
Appendix 1 and Table 1 provide the definition and source of all key variables, their units of 
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measurement, means, standard deviations (overall, between and within countries), and 
minimum and maximum values. Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between all key 
variables which aid the modelling and help to confirm the choice of instruments. As shown 
in Table 1, almost correlation coefficients are significant that aids the modelling and help to 
confirm the choice of dependent variables. Besides, the magnitudes, the statistical 
significance even the sign of correlation coefficient have been more or less altered. Thus, we 
should not be surprised to see different empirical results on the impacts of macroeconomic 
variables on sovereign bond yields.  
 
5. Empirical findings 
Table 3 reports the estimation results for different models: the baseline model (Model 1) and 
the models with the interaction terms between fiscal balance and dummy variables 
accounting for nonlinear impact of fiscal policy on bond yields. In general, we observe that 
the baseline model’s results are similar to those of other models, in which we control for 
countries’ different characteristics.  
As reported in Table 3, the potential growth enters in all estimated regressions with a 
negative but insignificant coefficient. This result seems to be not consistent with the 
theoretical hypotheses discussed above. The negative sign of the potential economic growth 
coefficient does not support the hypothesis that faster growing economies pay higher 
borrowing costs. This negative sign should be explained by the fact that in a wealthy 
economy leads to a decrease in sovereign debt and then a decrease in sovereign borrowing 
costs. However, this long-run relationship is not statistically significant, implying that in 
emerging Asia, sovereign bond yields are not determined by potential economic growth.  
Second, differing from earlier empirical works, we find evidence of a negative relationship 
between public debt and sovereign bond yields. This finding, once again, does not support 
the consideration of Manasse et al. (2003) that rising government debt may foster sovereign 
bond yields through the default risk premium. The negative but pretty small relationship 
between public debt and sovereign bond yields in emerging Asia may be explained in two 
ways. First, emerging Asia has experienced a number of supportive factors including strong 
underlying growth, conservative fiscal management, and financial repression that keep 
interest rates low even in a context of a rising sovereign debt. Second, comparing with 
advanced countries particularly debt-laden Europe, the balance sheets of most Asian 
economies remain strong (see Figure 3). External debt-to-GDP ratios have either declined 
significantly since 2009, as in the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines, or have stayed at 
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manageable levels. For this reason, in emerging Asia, the reaction of sovereign bond yields to 
public debt is so small: sovereign bond yields go down by about 0.5 basis points due to 100 
points increase in public debt.  
<Insert Figure 3> 
Third, most of the short-run determinants enter in estimated regression with significant 
coefficients. The results suggest that bond yields increase significantly when the fiscal 
balance deteriorates: an increase in the fiscal deficit of 100 points pushes down bond yields 
by 5.8 basis points. Similarly, for each 100 points increase in inflation rate, real sovereign 
bond yields decrease about 3.2 basis points. Additionally, inflation has an additional effect 
on yields through its potential impact on volatility, which in turn could complicate the 
conduct of fiscal policy and lead to higher deficits (Baldacci and Kumar, 2010) that once 
again lessen the value of sovereign bond yields. In general, inflation expectation plays an 
important role, either direct or indirect, in explaining sovereign bond yields’ variation. 
Unlike the impact of inflation rate, that of short-run changes in Central Bank’s rate is not 
confirmed. This finding evidences the preliminary interventions of emerging Asian 
authorities in separating government debt management from monetary management. The 
separation of debt and monetary managements may bring a set of benefits for emerging 
Asia. First, this separation would offer the central bank a necessary independence in 
monetary management and an environment to pursue an inflation target, if assigned by the 
government. Second, this separation would also provide focus to the task of asset-liability 
management of government liabilities, undertake risk analysis and allow prioritizing 
government expenditure through higher awareness of interest costs.  
Forth, economic growth is also significantly related to yields. In detail, higher growth leads 
to a compression in yields. This may be explained by the fact that higher growth results in 
higher tax revenues and smaller public social expenditures, which in turn reduce risk of 
fiscal slippage and fiscal vulnerability, and thus lower risk premium. Similarly, the 
relationship between foreign participation and bond yields is also negative. This finding 
seems to be consistent with some theoretical considerations meaning that foreign investors 
can be an important source of demand for local debt securities and thus allow lowering bond 
yields. In fact, foreign capital inflows enable emerging Asia to finance investment and 
foreign participation in local bond markets is seen as a way to accelerate the development of 
domestic financial infrastructure. Even though a growing demand of foreign investors for 
sovereign bonds lead to a decrease in bond yields, the emerging Asian authorities still tend 
to maintain an attractive level of sovereign bond yields in order to avoid the possible retire of 
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foreign investors especially in times of global financial instability. This issue is verified by 
such a small fall about 0.1 basis points in sovereign bond yield following 100 points increase 
in foreign participation.  
Firth, relating to the impacts of global factors, on one hand, we find that the financial turmoil 
slightly drives sovereign bond yields up. On the other hand, the coefficient on the U.S. 
Federal funds rate is positive and significant. This result suggests that the U.S. monetary 
policy decisions at least partially reflect global risk aversion, which also influences sovereign 
bond markets in emerging Asia. Consequently, a short-run changes in the U.S. monetary 
policy results in a temporary rising trend in Asian real bond yields. Lastly, the empirical 
results find evidence that sovereign bond yields in emerging Asia do not depend on the 
initial level of macroeconomic characteristics such as fiscal condition, institutional quality, 
domestic savings and capital account openness.      
We now turn our attention to the empirical results in the alternative models (Model 2-5) in 
which the fiscal balance is interacted with dummy variables accounting for several specific 
characteristics of each country (listed in the previous section). Overall, the empirical results 
are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of the fiscal balance due to the changes 
in some structural factors. As reported in Table 3, most of interactive terms between fiscal 
balance and macroeconomic characteristics enter in estimated model with an insignificant 
coefficient, except the case of Model 3, in which we control for the potential endogeneity of 
fiscal balance by using the initial level of public debt as an instrumental variable. Precisely, 
the interactive term between fiscal balance and initial debt level plays a negative and 
significant role in determining sovereign bond yields. This evidence reinforces the negative 
link between fiscal position and sovereign bond yields in emerging Asia. Overall, the 
empirical results allow us to conclude that the nature of short-run relationship between 
sovereign bond yields and fiscal balance does not depend on the initial level of 
macroeconomic fundamentals as suggested by Baldacci and Kumar (2010).   
Sensitivity of empirical results 
This sub-section carries out a set of robustness checks to examine the results’ sensitivity to 
alternative estimation strategies. The first robustness check involves using an alternative 
estimation method. We report in Table 4 the results of estimating the sovereign bond yields 
using the Fixed-effects FE estimator, in which country and time dummies are included. The 
empirical results are qualitatively very similar to those obtained using the Dynamic GMM 
estimator that are reported in Table 3. While the magnitude of estimated coefficients is 
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changed, most of coefficients have the same sign and are highly significant as those obtained 
with the GMM estimator.  
We also estimated the same equation using Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator. In this step, 
instead of including in empirical model the interaction terms between fiscal balance and 
some specific characteristics of country, we estimate the model by directly instrumenting the 
fiscal balance with a set of structural macroeconomic variables. Moreover, the fundamental 
macroeconomic variables are now measured in percentage of GDP (not explained in 
dummy), including the initial level of: fiscal deficit, debt, institutional quality, domestic 
savings, and inward FDI. We use the average value over the 1990-1993 period as a proxy of 
the initial level of five variables listed above. The IV allows correcting the country-specific 
and time-specific effects and getting rid of any endogeneity in explanatory variables.  
Above all, we test for the robustness of each IV estimated equation by performing four 
econometric tests, which results are reported in the lower part of Table 4. The first one is the 
under-identification test under the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified. As 
reported in Table 4, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics are such important, meaning that 
the null hypothesis is rejected and the model is identified. Second, in the weak instrument 
test, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics, which are superior to the critical value of 5% 
maximal IV size proposed by Stock and Yogo (2002), also allow us to argue that weak 
instrument is not present in our models. Third, the Hansen J test checks the over-
identification of all instruments.  According to the empirical results, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of Hansen test, meaning that the instruments are valid instruments, notably 
uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation. Lastly, the results of endogeneity test reported in the last line 
allow us to accept the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors can actually 
be treated as exogenous.  
We now look at the IV estimator’s main results reported in the last column of Table 4. The IV 
results are, by and large, similar to those of the GMM estimator in terms of sign and 
significance, but the magnitudes are different as would be expected. Therefore, we conclude 
that the qualitative nature of our results is robust to alternative estimation methods. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The question about the fundamental factors, which can affect government borrowing costs, 
has been reviewed by a number of studies, either theoretical or empirical. However, this 
issue is less documented for emerging economies, especially for emerging Asian countries. 
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To fill this knowledge gap, this present paper attempts to shed light on the macroeconomic 
determinants of sovereign bond yields for a sample of nine emerging Asian countries over 
the period 1994-2012. Our empirical findings on the link between the long-run and short-run 
determinants and sovereign bond yields are, by and large, insensitive to a range of datasets 
and estimation methods. 
We find that both country-specific fundamentals and global factors are important 
determinants of sovereign bond yields. Our empirical findings, however, provide only 
partial support to the concerned literature. In the long-run, we first reveal that the 
relationship between public debt and sovereign bond yields in emerging Asia is significant 
but weakly negative. This evidence is not consistent with the theoretical consideration 
suggesting that rising government debt may push up sovereign bond yields. Second, we fail 
to confirm the role of potential growth in explaining the changes in sovereign bond curve.  
In the short-run, the empirical results suggest that emerging Asia’s sovereign bond yields 
negatively vary in function of the changes in  economic growth rate, fiscal balance, inflation 
expectation, and foreign participation in the local bond markets. On the other hand, the 
variation of bond curve in emerging Asia depends on global factors, such as the U.S. 
monetary policy decision and global financial stability. This paper also finds out a rising 
independence between government debt management and the central bank’s monetary 
control.  
To conclude, the present study is complementary to the existing literature that has seemed to 
only focus on the determinants of sovereign bond yields in advanced economies. Moreover, 
our results offer an important blessing for emerging Asia’s authorities aspiring to manage 
their sovereign bond curves by considering the changes in macroeconomics fundamentals 
such as public debt, economic growth, and fiscal balance and so on.   
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Appendix 1: Description of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variable   
Real long-term interest 
rate on government bonds 
(in percent) 
Nominal 10 year benchmark bond 
yield minus inflation divided over 
one plus inflation (Fisher's 
formula) 
Datastream 
Long-run determinants   
Government debt Ratio of general government debt 
to GDP 
WEO; Trading Economics 
Potential growth Real GDP growth filtered of 
cyclical fluctuations 
Author’s calculations 
from Datastream 
Short-run determinants   
Real money market rate Nominal Central Bank’s rate minus 
inflation divided over one plus 
inflation (Fisher’s formula) 
Datastream, Trading 
Econimics 
Inflation rate CPI inflation Oxford Economics 
Fiscal balance ratio Ratio of general government 
primary balance to GDP 
WEO 
Economic growth rate Real GDP growth Oxford Economics 
Foreign participation stock of foreign holdings of local 
currency bonds 
Oxford Economics 
The U.S. Federal funds 
rate 
The U.S. Federal funds rate Datastream 
Dummy variables   
Large Initial Fiscal Deficit Fiscal deficit above 2 percent of 
GDP in the previous year 
WDI, IFS 
High Initial Debt General government debt above 60 
percent of GDP in the previous 
year 
WDI, IFS 
Quality of Institutions Regulatory quality index above 
sample average 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, WDI 
High FDI Annual FDI higher than 10 percent 
of GDP 
WDI 
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Figure 1 : 10 – year sovereign bond yields in emerging Asia 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation from Datastream and Trading Economics 
 
Figure 2: Central Bank’s interest rate 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation from Datastream, Trading Economics and IFS database 
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Figure 3: External debt-to-GDP ratios in emerging Asia 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation from WDI source 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sovereign bond yield (SY) 653 0.350 0.868 -0.989 10.150 
Public debt (PD) 684 46.005 25.458 6.137 108.300 
Potential GDP growth rate (PoGDP) 684 3.562 3.627 -11.738 14.755 
Real money market rate (RATE) 673 1.311 4.592 -25.840 44.620 
Inflation rate (INF) 680 5.153 5.791 -0.600 90.800 
Fiscal balance (FB) 684 0.136 4.589 -6.686 20.488 
GDP growth rate (GDP) 679 3.626 4.157 -17.930 16.116 
Foreign participation (FP) 684 43.175 49.912 -18.865 231.569 
The U.S. Federal fund rates (FED) 684 3.225 2.237 0.075 6.520 
 
 
Table 2: Bivariate Correlation coefficients 
 
SY PD PoGDP RATE INF FB GDP FP FED 
SY 1.00      
PD -0.075* 1.00      
PoGDP -0.060 0.025 1.00      
Money Rate 0.070* -0.064* 0.229* 1.00      
INF -0.365* 0.018 0.029 -0.179* 1.00      
FB -0.228* 0.185* -0.137* -0.027 -0.113* 1.00     
GDP -0.026 0.059 0.706* 0.149* -0.153* -0.147* 1.00   
FP 0.004 0.058 -0.366* -0.287* -0.206* 0.305* -0.331* 1.00  
FED 0.015 -0.118* 0.040 0.361* 0.148* 0.218* 0.014 -0.216* 1.00 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at least the 10% level 
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Table 3: GMM estimator’s results 
 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 21 Model 31 Model 41 Model 51 
Sovereign bond yield  
0.597*** 
(0.104) 
0.611*** 
(0.103) 
0.609*** 
(0.102) 
0.610*** 
(0.103) 
0.611*** 
(0.102) 
Public debt  
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Potential GDP growth rate  
-0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
Real money market rate  
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
Inflation rate  
-0.032** 
(0.015) 
-0.033** 
(0.015) 
-0.034** 
(0.015) 
-0.033** 
(0.015) 
-0.033** 
(0.015) 
Fiscal balance  
-0.058*** 
(0.009) 
-0.057*** 
(0.009) 
-0.046*** 
(0.011) 
-0.067** 
(0.029) 
-0.055*** 
(0.016) 
GDP growth rate  
-0.026*** 
(0.009) 
-0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
-0.029*** 
(0.010) 
-0.030*** 
(0.009) 
Foreign participation  
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
The U.S. Federal fund rates 
0.034** 
(0.011) 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
0.029** 
(0.013) 
0.030** 
(0.013) 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
Financial crisis 
0.124* 
(0.073) 
0.121* 
(0.068) 
0.124* 
(0.066) 
0.124* 
(0.067) 
0.122* 
(0.068) 
Dummy variable      
High initial fiscal deficit 
0.005 
(0.081) 
0.004 
(0.025) 
   
High initial debt 
0.061 
(0.096) 
 
-0.020* 
(0.011) 
  
Quality of institutions 
-0.233 
(0.187) 
  
0.011 
(0.024) 
 
High FDI 
-0.061 
(0.067) 
  
 -0.002 
(0.011) 
Constant 
0.717*** 
(0.188) 
0.638*** 
(0.158) 
0.675*** 
(0.200) 
0.604*** 
(0.154) 
0.632*** 
(0.168) 
Number of observations 
 
623 
 
 
623 
 
 
623 
 
 
623 
 
623 
 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value 0.1284 0.1305 0.1317 0.1317 0.1310 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value 0.4443 0.4397 0.4408 0.4428 0.4402 
Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *** (**; *): Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
1: Model with the interaction of fiscal balance with dummy variables for countries' characteristics. 
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Table 4: Results of FE and IV estimators 
 
Independent variables 
FE estimator  IV estimator 
Model 1 Model 21 Model 31 Model 41 Model 51  
Sovereign bond yield  
0.612*** 
(0.112) 
0.624*** 
(0.111) 
0.625*** 
(0.108) 
0,620*** 
(0,110) 
0,624*** 
(0,108) 
 0,683*** 
(0,135) 
Public debt  
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0,005** 
(0,002) 
-0,005** 
(0,002) 
 -0,005*** 
(0,001) 
Potential GDP growth 
rate  
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
-0,010 
(0,010) 
-0,011 
(0,012) 
 0,005 
(0,007) 
Real money market rate  
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0,004 
(0,007) 
-0,004 
(0,007) 
 -0,003 
(0,005) 
Inflation rate  
-0.031* 
(0.015) 
-0.031* 
(0.015) 
-0.032** 
(0.015) 
-0,031** 
(0,015) 
-0,031** 
(0,015) 
 -0,026*** 
(0,009) 
Fiscal balance  
-0.051*** 
(0.010) 
-0.048*** 
(0.009) 
-0.045*** 
(0.012) 
-0,078** 
(0,037) 
-0,055** 
(0,018) 
 -0,015*** 
(0,006) 
GDP growth rate  
-0.024** 
(0.010) 
-0.028** 
(0.010) 
-0.028** 
(0.011) 
-0,026** 
(0,010) 
-0,027** 
(0,010) 
 -0,018*** 
(0,006) 
Foreign participation  
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0,001** 
(0,001) 
-0,002** 
(0,001) 
 -0,001** 
(0,000) 
The U.S. Federal fund 
rates 
0.034*** 
(0.010) 
0.030** 
(0.011) 
0.030** 
(0.011) 
0,032** 
(0,013) 
0,030** 
(0,011) 
 0,022** 
(0,010) 
Financial crisis 
0.169** 
(0.080) 
0.146** 
(0.074) 
0.144** 
(0.070) 
0,147µµ 
(0,072) 
0,145** 
(0,072) 
 0,123** 
(0,052) 
Dummy variables        
High initial fiscal deficit 
0.017 
(0.087) 
-0.007 
(0.027) 
   
  
High initial debt 
0.101** 
(0.047) 
 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
  
  
Quality of institutions 
-0.201 
(0.121) 
  0,029 
(0,028) 
 
  
High FDI 
-0.047 
(0.066) 
  
 
0,007 
(0,012) 
  
Constant 
0.679*** 
(0.207) 
0.578*** 
(0.176) 
0.614*** 
(0.202) 
0,542*** 
(0,173) 
0,580*** 
(0,185) 
 0,186** 
(0,081) 
Number of observations 638 638 638 638 638  638 
 
 Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
 186.746 
[0.000] 
 
 Weak identification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic) 
 (148.342)a 
 
 Overidentification test of instruments 
(Hansen J statistic) 
 3.920 
[0.4169] 
 
 
Endogeneity test 
 2.671 
[0.1022] 
Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values. *** (**; *): Significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. 1: Model with the interaction of fiscal balance with dummy variables for countries' 
characteristics in bold. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. ()a, Critical value of 5 percent maximal IV size 
proposed by Stock and Yogo (2002).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Les Cahiers de la Chaire Finance rassemblent les documents de travail du LEMNA s'inscrivant dans des 
projets de recherche qu'elle soutient. 
 
 
N° 2012-06 Are Islamic Indexes more Volatile than Conventional Indexes? 
 Evidence from Dow Jones Indexes 
  CHARLES Amélie, DARNÉ Olivier et POP Adrian 
 
N° 2012-07 Large Shocks in the Volatility of the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
 Index: 1928-2010 
  CHARLES Amélie et DARNÉ Olivier 
 
N° 2012-08 The Quality of Private Monitoring in European Banking: Completing 
 the Picture 
  POP Adrian et POP Diana 
 
N° 2012-09 Effets socioéconomiques de la crise financière : implications pour le 
 Vietnam 
  LAUZANAS Jean-Marc, PERRAUDEAU Yves et POP Adrian 
 
N° 2012-31 Efficiency Gains from Narrowing Banks: A Search-Theoretic Approach 
  TRIPIER Fabien 
 
N° 2012-32 Volatility Persistence in Crude Oil Markets 
  CHARLES Amélie et DARNÉ Olivier 
 
N° 2012-40 La modélisation en équilibre général et stochastique des cycles  
  économiques en Afrique Sub-saharienne : une revue de la littérature 
  NOUASSI Claude Francis et TRIPIER Fabien 
 
 
Les opinions exposées dans ce document n’engagent que les auteurs. Ceux-ci assument la responsabilité de toute 
erreur ou omission. 
 
La Chaire Finance est une initiative de la Banque Populaire Atlantique, la Caisse d’Epargne Bretagne-Pays de Loire, la 
Caisse des Dépôts, du Crédit Maritime et de l’Université de Nantes, sous l’égide de la Fondation de Projets de 
l’Université de Nantes. 
Site web : http://www.univ-nantes.fr/fondation/chairefinance 
 
Contact  
Chaire Finance, Banque Populaire – Caisse d’Epargne 
IEMN-IAE, Chemin de Censive du Tertre – BP 52231 
44322 Nantes cedex 3 
Tél : +33 (0)2 40 14 16 60 
Fax : +33 (0)2 40 14 16 50 
Email : Flavie.Chamard-Gueret@univ-nantes.fr  
L
es
 C
ah
ie
rs
 d
e 
la
 C
h
ai
re
 F
in
an
ce
 
   
W
o
rk
in
g
 P
ap
er
 S
er
ie
s 
 
  
 
N° 2012-41 The Dynamics of Gasoline Prices: Evidence from Daily French Micro 
Data  
  GAUTIER Erwan et LE SAOUT Ronan 
 
N° 2014-07 Stock Exchange Mergers and Market Efficiency 
  CHARLES Amélie, DARNÉ Olivier, KIM Jae et REDOR Etienne 
 
N° 2014-08 On the Relationship between the Prices of Oil and the Precious Metals: 
Revisiting with a Multivariate Regime-Switching Decision Tree 
  CHARLOT Philippe et MARIMOUTOU Vêlayoudom 
 
N° 2014-17 Precious metals shine? A market efficiency perspective 
  CHARLES Amélie, DARNÉ Olivier et KIM Jae 
 
N° 2014-18 Sovereign bond yields in emerging Asia: New evidence 
  PHAM Thi Hong Hanh 
 
L
es
 C
ah
ie
rs
 d
e 
la
 C
h
ai
re
 F
in
an
ce
 
   
W
o
rk
in
g
 P
ap
er
 S
er
ie
s 
 
